In this paper I analyze the use of the concepts of «God» and «Sovereign» in the Later Middle Age. I try to show the analogies between the properties of both concepts. On the other hand I analyze: 1 o the epistemological problems of the relation God-World and State-Law; 2° the analogy between the miracle and the original constitutive power; 3° the resemblance between the pope infallibility and the sentence of a supreme tribunal. At the end I make reference to the (...) legitimatory role of these analogies to enhance the institution of the sovereign in these historical context. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: Die Wissenschaftslehre als System der unvollendeten Vollendung. - Fichtes Wechselwirkung und der implizite Hoerer der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. - Die Begrenzung: vom Anstoss zur Aufforderung. - Die Idee des Leibes im Jenaer System. - Fichtes politische und Rechtsphilosophie in der Deutung Richard Schottkys. - Gibt es bei Fichte eine transzendentale Anthropologie?.

Aus dem Inhalt: Die Wissenschaftslehre als System der unvollendeten Vollendung (Sven Juergensen). - Fichtes Wechselwirkung und der implizite Hoerer der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (Guenther Zoeller). - Die Begrenzung: vom Anstoss zur Aufforderung (Jacinto Rivera de Rosales). - Die Idee des Leibes im Jenaer System (Virginia Lopez-Dominguez). - Fichtes politische und Rechtsphilosophie in der Deutung Richard Schottkys (Carla de Pascale). - Gibt es bei Fichte eine transzendentale Anthropologie? (Jose L. Villacanas).

In view of the changes and achievements which the science and technique are producing at the end of the XV and XVI centuries, fragmenting the medieval order, Fernán Pérez de Oliva, in order to bring into harmony the new Renaissance times, will offer a new image of the human being. This will must be as the well tuned vihuela wich produces sweet harmony.

¿Es posible compatibilizar una suerte de relativismo epistémico con una defensa de la racionalidad científica? La profesora Pérez Ransanz, además de exponer con claridad la manera en que Thomas S. Kuhn adopta ese doble compromiso, intenta justificar la viabilidad de tal planteamiento. Este objetivo se inscribe en el marco de mostrar que en la reflexión filosófica de Kuhn sobre la ciencia, desde la aparición de La estructura de las revoluciones científica hasta las aportaciones previas a su fallecimiento en 1996, (...) hay continuidad, coherencia y un progresivo enriquecimiento de sus puntos de vista, por encima de pequeñas diferencias que efectivamente pueden encontrarse entre sus diferentes escritos. (shrink)

En este trabajo se define formamente el concepto de representacion en química utilizando homomorfismos desde estructuras algebraicas, que llamamos sistemas de tipo C, en otras estructuras especiales de símbolos muy relacionados con los que son habituales en la qímica experimental. Para la definicion de los sistemas de tipo C se ha seleccionado un conjunto minimo de relaciones y funciones, que son necesarias para expresar proposiciones significativas en química. Tambien se define un lenguaje formal de primer orden adecuado a los sistemas (...) de tipo C, que llamamos L. EI resultado principal que se demuestra es que toda representación que verifica las mismas sentencias de L que un sistema de tipo C, es necesariamente isomorfo a él. Se concluye por lo tanto que puede existir un problema linguístico subyacente en la aplicacion que de la mecaníca cuántica se hace en la química teórica.The concept of representation in chemistry bas been formallv defined by means of homomorphisms from algebraical structures, which we call type-C systems, to some special sets of symbols which can be related to the symbols ordinarily used in experimental chemistry. A minimum number of relations and functions, which would suffice to express significant propositions in chemistry, have been chosen to define type-C systems. A first order formal language L adequate to type-C systems has been defined. It has been shown that each representation that verifies the same sentences of L as a type-C system is necessarily isomorphic to it. It is concluded that a systematic study of the representation problem in chemistry is in order because a deep language problem underlies the application of quantum mechanies to chemical problems. (shrink)

8 March, now known as International Women’s Day, is a day for feminist claims where demonstrations are organized in over 150 countries, with the participation of millions of women all around the world. These demonstrations can be viewed as collective rituals and thus focus attention on the processes that facilitate different psychosocial effects. This work aims to explore the mechanisms involved in participation in the demonstrations of 8 March 2020, collective and ritualized feminist actions, and their correlates associated with personal (...) well-being and collective well-being, collective efficacy and collective growth, and behavioral intention to support the fight for women’s rights. To this end, a cross-cultural study was conducted with the participation of 2,854 people from countries in Latin America and Europe, with a retrospective correlational cross-sectional design and a convenience sample. Participants were divided between demonstration participants and non-demonstrators or followers who monitored participants through the media and social networks. Compared with non-demonstrators and with males, female and non-binary gender respondents had greater scores in mechanisms and criterion variables. Further random-effects model meta-analyses revealed that the perceived emotional synchrony was consistently associated with more proximal mechanisms, as well as with criterion variables. Finally, sequential moderation analyses showed that proposed mechanisms successfully mediated the effects of participation on every criterion variable. These results indicate that participation in 8M marches and demonstrations can be analyzed through the literature on collective rituals. As such, collective participation implies positive outcomes both individually and collectively, which are further reinforced through key psychological mechanisms, in line with a Durkheimian approach to collective rituals. (shrink)

En este trabajo se define formamente el concepto de representacion en química utilizando homomorfismos desde estructuras algebraicas, que llamamos sistemas de tipo C, en otras estructuras especiales de símbolos muy relacionados con los que son habituales en la qímica experimental. Para la definicion de los sistemas de tipo C se ha seleccionado un conjunto minimo de relaciones y funciones, que son necesarias para expresar proposiciones significativas en química. Tambien se define un lenguaje formal de primer orden adecuado a los sistemas (...) de tipo C, que llamamos L(C). EI resultado principal que se demuestra es que toda representación que verifica las mismas sentencias de L(C) que un sistema de tipo C, es necesariamente isomorfo a él. Se concluye por lo tanto que puede existir un problema linguístico subyacente en la aplicacion que de la mecaníca cuántica se hace en la química teórica.The concept of representation in chemistry bas been formallv defined by means of homomorphisms from algebraical structures, which we call type-C systems, to some special sets of symbols which can be related to the symbols ordinarily used in experimental chemistry. A minimum number of relations and functions, which would suffice to express significant propositions in chemistry, have been chosen to define type-C systems. A first order formal language L(C) adequate to type-C systems has been defined. It has been shown that each representation that verifies the same sentences of L(C) as a type-C system is necessarily isomorphic to it. It is concluded that a systematic study of the representation problem in chemistry is in order because a deep language problem underlies the application of quantum mechanies to chemical problems. (shrink)

This article answer what could be the distinction that the Stoics established between philosophy and the kata philosophian logos, according to the report by D.L., VII, 39-41. In this place I distance from the scholars who consider that the distinction is ontological, this is, that the kata philosophian logos refers to the discursive presentation of Stoic dogmas, whose nature is incorporeal, while the philosophy refers to a disposition of the soul, whose nature is corporeal. I rather propose that both are (...) dispositiones or states of the rational part of the soul and that the difference is in the degree of perfection that they have accomplished. (shrink)

SUMARIO Artículos ¿Por qué democracia? Referencia a los derechos humanos y a la ciudadanía. Why democracy? Reference to human rights and citizenship. Bozo de Carmona, Ana Julia Libertad de expresión y "libertad cómica". Free speech and "comical liberty".Calvo González, José La justicia según J. Finnis. Justice according to John Finnis. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El lenguaje sagrado y su escritura. The sacred language and its writing. Lizaola, Julieta Del carácter coactivo de la μετηνεστασζ en Tucídides. On cornening to compelling (...) nature of Thucydides' μετηνεστασζ. Meabe, Joaquín E. Apuntes para una filosofía crítica de la historia regional. Notes for a critical philosophy concern to the regional history. Mora García, José Pascual Competencia política partidista en los textos de Simón Bolívar . The defender political competition in the Simon Bolivar’s writings . Ortiz Palanques, Marco Fundamentación socio-jurídica de los procesos normativos. Social and juridical reasoning about the normatives changes. Pavó Acosta, Rolando Filosofía y psicopatología en Karl Jaspers: los entramados de la existencia. Philosophy and psychopathology in Karl Jaspers: the studworks of the existence. Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. La doctrina platónica del alma en la «república». The platonic doctrine of the soul in the «republic» dialogue. Suzzarini, Andrés Una aproximación a la concepción romana del derecho. An estimate study to the roman concept of law. Terán Pimentel, Milagros Interdisciplinares Lo dionisíaco y lo apolíneo en Don Juan Tenorio. The dionysiac and the apolline in Don Juan Tenorio. Pérez Lo Presti, Alirio. (shrink)

¿Por qué democracia? Referencia a los derechos humanos y a la ciudadanía. Why democracy? Reference to human rights and citizenship. Bozo de Carmona, Ana Julia Libertad de expresión y "libertad cómica". Free speech and "comical liberty".Calvo González, José La justicia según J. Finnis. Justice according to John Finnis. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El lenguaje sagrado y su escritura. The sacred language and its writing. Lizaola, Julieta Del carácter coactivo de la μετηνεστασζ en Tucídides. On cornening to compelling nature of (...) Thucydides' μετηνεστασζ. Meabe, Joaquín E. Apuntes para una filosofía crítica de la historia regional. Notes for a critical philosophy concern to the regional history. Mora García, José Pascual Competencia política partidista en los textos de Simón Bolívar . The defender political competition in the Simon Bolivar’s writings . Ortiz Palanques, Marco Fundamentación socio-jurídica de los procesos normativos. Social and juridical reasoning about the normatives changes. Pavó Acosta, Rolando Filosofía y psicopatología en Karl Jaspers: los entramados de la existencia. Philosophy and psychopathology in Karl Jaspers: the studworks of the existence. Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. La doctrina platónica del alma en la «república». The platonic doctrine of the soul in the «republic» dialogue. Suzzarini, Andrés Una aproximación a la concepción romana del derecho. An estimate study to the roman concept of law. Terán Pimentel, Milagros Interdisciplinares Lo dionisíaco y lo apolíneo en Don Juan Tenorio. The dionysiac and the apolline in Don Juan Tenorio. Pérez Lo Presti, Alirio. (shrink)

Como parte del trabajo del taller interno permanente del Cuerpo Académico de Estética y Arte de la Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, el 12 de noviembre de 2013 se realizó una Mesa Redonda sobre el tema “Universalidad e identidad cultural”. En esta Mesa participaron los doctores José Ramón Fabelo Corzo, José Antonio Pérez Diestre y Ramón Patiño Espino, como ponentes principales; además, se contó con la asistencia del doctor Jesús Márquez Carrillo, quien se integró al debate. Diferentes (...) disciplinas —la filosofía, la antropología, la historia del pensamiento y del arte, incluso la biología— pueden, cada una, ofrecer sus aportes al tan socorrido tema de la relación entre lo universal y lo propio en la cultura latinoamericana. El debate suscitado puso de manifiesto esa diversidad de aportaciones. En este trabajo presentamos las intervenciones realizadas por cada uno de los integrantes de la mesa, en el orden en que se produjeron. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Defending a Phenomenological–Behavioral Perspective: Culture, Behavior, and ExperienceMarino Pérez-Álvarez (bio), José M. García-Montes (bio), Adolfo J. Cangas (bio), and Louis A. Sass (bio)KeywordsBehavior, contextual phenomenology, culture, experienceWe should like to express our sincere thanks to all the authors for their commentaries on our articles. Given the restrictions of space (a limitation they too had to contend with), we can only respond to a few aspects of their (...) interesting remarks. We shall reply of course on the basis of our own approach—an approach that sets out to integrate culture, behavior, and experience, and that might be termed contextual phenomenology, phenomenological behaviorism, or perhaps most accurately (albeit more awkwardly), the phenomenological–behavioral perspective.In her commentary, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008), referring to the target articles “Phenomenology and behaviorism” (Pérez-Álvarez, Sass, and Cangas 2008) and “The role of superstition in psychopathology” (García-Montes et al. 2008), wonders whether our maintaining of the spirit of Skinner, as well as our recourse to phenomenology, might not themselves represent forms of superstitious behavior. She points out that it is not always a good idea to put new wine in old barrels. For her, the new wine and new barrels would be represented by social constructivism, of which she is reminded by some aspects of our work. But in making her own case, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) reveals certain common prejudices concerning behaviorism, prejudices that have apparently persisted even after reading our article. Thus, for example, she does not see operant behavior as incorporating intentionality (what, in the target article, is presented in terms of final causality), because she assumes that intentionality would necessarily imply a mentalist and dualist notion involving a supposed internal mental entity that causes behavior. Skinner (1974) himself noted and rejected this very assumption in a passage that clearly distinguishes his own approach from what he calls a “stimulus-response formula”: “Possibly no charge,” he wrote,is more often leveled against behaviorism or a science of behavior than that it cannot deal with purpose or intention. A stimulus-response formula has no answer, but operant behavior is the very field of purpose and [End Page 281] intention. By its nature it is directed toward the future: a person acts in order that something will happen, and the order is temporal.(pp. 55–6)The place Skinner gives to intentionality and purpose is elaborated in our target article.Furthermore, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) assumes that, on methodological grounds, Skinner rejects all that is not observable, or at least that cannot be operationalized. This, however, is simply incorrect, at least as regards Skinner’s radical behaviorism. As the reader may recall, radical (as opposed to methodological) behaviorism is neither operationalist nor does it reject private or subjective events because of their unobservability. Indeed, Skinner specifically acknowledges that such events are in fact observable—at least for one person: the subject him- or herself. The question for Skinner is to understand how the part of the world that is only observable and experiential for oneself is constructed or formed. In the end, it turns out that radical behaviorism is more radical, in the Aristotelian ontological sense (see Pérez-Alvarez, Sass, and García-Montes 2008), than post-modern constructionism. Indeed, as we remarked, radical behaviorism can still surprise us today. Similarly, phenomenology is starting to be missed in the clinical context (Andreasen 2007). We believe that radical behaviorism and phenomenology, mutually readjusted, are in fact excellent wines for the times we live in—if only we knew how to appreciate them.In their commentary on “Phenomenology and behaviorism: A mutual readjustment,” Fletcher and Hayes (2008) argue that the philosophy and theory of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)/Relational Frame Theory (RFT) already contain the salutary aspects of phenomenology that we highlight in our target article. Their insistence on reducing the affinities we find between phenomenology and behaviorism to ACT/RFT consists, in our view, in a scientific–technical argument that is more scientistic than strictly philosophical in nature. Their insistence on the scientific–technical argument itself implies an unclarified philosophical assumption. On what grounds do experimental data constitute the last word? Has... (shrink)

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke rejects some of the most popular accounts of what meaning facts consist in on the grounds that they fail to accommodate the normative character of meaning. I argue that a widespread interpretation of Kripke's argument is incorrect. I contend that the argument does not rest on the contrast between descriptive and normative facts, but on the thought that speakers' uses of linguistic expressions have to be justified. I suggest that the line (...) of reasoning that I attribute to Kripke can be seen as putting pressure on the idea that predicate satisfaction is to be explained in terms of a relation between predicates and properties. (shrink)

The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.

ABSTRACTWe discuss the thesis of universality of geometric notions and offer critical reflections on the concept of “natural geometry” employed by Spelke and others. Promoting interdisciplinary wor...

The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe.

In the recent literature on confirmation there are two leading approaches to the provision of a probabilistic measure of the degree to which a hypothesis is confirmed by evidence. The first is to construe the degree to which evidence E confirms hypothesis H as a function that is directly proportional to p and inversely proportional to p . I shall refer to this as the probability approach. The second approach construes the notion as a function that is directly proportional to (...) the true-positive rate – the probability of the evidence if the hypothesis is true, p – and inversely proportional to the false-positive rate – the probability of the evidence if the hypothesis is false, p . These reverse conditional probabilities – of the evidence on the truth or falsehood of the hypothesis – are sometimes known as likelihoods. I shall refer to the approach to confirmation that uses them as the likelihood approach.For each of these approaches, there are two obvious options as to how to define the confirmation function. The first is to define it as the difference between the magnitude that is treated as increasing confirmation or p ) and the magnitude that is treated as decreasing confirmation or p ). The second is to define confirmation as the quotient of these two magnitudes.This yields four different measures of confirmation, represented in the following table: Differences RatiosProbabilities PD = p – p1 PR = Graphic2Likelihoods LD = p – p3 LR = Graphic4All these measures agree on whether or not E provides some support for H. Intuitively, we want to say that E provides some support for H just in case learning that E is true would make us assign a higher probability to H, i.e. when p(H …. (shrink)

The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...) these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue that some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be seen as addressing the twin problems of semantic unity and...

El pensamiento utópico es un producto especialmente significativo de la modernidad occidental y, por tanto, no debe sorprender que la crisis que se ha cebado sobre ella lo arrastre consigo como pieza herida de muerte. A medida que nuestra postmodernidad, largamente anunciada desde Nietzsche, ha ido configurándose como nueva etapa en la que las pretensiones de la razón moderna evidencian el resquebrajamiento de lo que parecían sus bases más sólidas, el pensamiento utópico a través del cual plasmó sus ideales resulta (...) fuertemente cuestionado, tanto que apenas si es posible una honrosa salida de la escena cultural mediante revisión autocrítica de sus planteamientos. Achicado al máximo el espacio para la utopía en la reflexión filosófica contemporánea, ni siquiera cabe una cura de adelgazamiento de pensar utópico para hacerlo sostenible en medio de nuestras perplejidades. Hoy, y en cualquier caso venciendo un pudor difícilmente superable, cuesta asumir la defensa de lo utópico, y si se ha puesto muy complicado hablar de utopía es por el riesgo de caer bajo la doble acusación de ingenuidad y de cinismo. ¿Quién lo iba a decir, cuando el pensamiento utópico logró afirmarse como ariete de la crítica del orden establecido frente al pragmatismo de los defensores del statu quo? (shrink)

La filosofía de la historia se halla en un momento crucial. Ha de repensar categorías fundamentales -como la de progreso-, y debe hacerlo con tanta voluntad de escucha como espíritu crítico, recogiendo aportaciones que enriquezcan sus perspectivas. Es el caso de algunas que continúan procediendo de la herencia judeocristiana -matriz de la conciencia histórica de Occidente1- y, más concretamente, provenientes del Apocalipsis. Estas páginas se inician con propuestas en torno al acceso hermenéutico a ese último libro de la Biblia. La (...) recepción de su legado por una hermenéutica filosófica iluminará la tarea de plantear el postulado del progreso bajo el impacto de lo que supone el punto de vista de la redención, abordando en términos filosóficos la coimplicación de sentido de la existencia de los individuos y sentido de la historia. (shrink)

James Shaw has written an excellent book on Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. It manages to provide fresh perspectives on a topic on which it seemed.

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity – particularly diversity of viewpoints – for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: (1) Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years. (2) This lack of political diversity can undermine (...) the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike. (3) Increased political diversity would improve social psychological science by reducing the impact of bias mechanisms such as confirmation bias, and by empowering dissenting minorities to improve the quality of the majority's thinking. (4) The underrepresentation of non-liberals in social psychology is most likely due to a combination of self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination. We close with recommendations for increasing political diversity in social psychology. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the legal case involving the Court of Arbitration of Sport, the Union of European Football Associations, and the Turkish team Eskişehirspor to analyze the leg...

El presente ensayo plantea la posibilidad de considerar nuevamente al diseño editorial como una actividad artística. Este campo no pudo escapar al fenómeno de la sociedad del espectáculo que hoy envuelve a casi toda actividad humana. Ello indiscutiblemente afecta la manera en que se valora esta actividad actualmente, vista las más de las veces como un simple aditamento utilitario con más fines comerciales que artísticos. A pesar de ello no deja de ser loable una revaloración de la disciplina que la (...) considere como una producción también transutilitaria, un fenómeno a la vez estético y extraestético y una actividad que, a través de su propia praxis, construye al ser histórico... (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende mostrar las líneas generales de la propuesta humeana de una teoría de la evolución de las instituciones en clave utilitarista; en segundo lugar, analizará la objeción interna a esta teoría que supone la existencia de posibles sujetos no cooperadores pero inteligentes, en tercer lugar, intentará también defender dicha teoría de la acusación externa de no tener un auténtico carácter normativo; y al no haber desarrollado el propio Hume con detalle su contestación al problema del conflicto Moral/Racionalidad, tal (...) y como surge en el contexto de su discusión de la Knavery, finalmente, y en cuarto lugar, este trabajo, yendo en un cierto sentido algo más allá de lo propuesto por Hume, ensayará un argumento post-humeano en torno a ese conflicto, basado, por una parte, en el reconocimiento de la multidimensionalidad de la Moral, así como en la paralela aceptación de la necesidad de un ajuste contextual de ésta, asentado sobre consideraciones primaria, que no exclusivamente, utilitaristas. (shrink)

I take issue with Robert Brandom’s claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn’t undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherrilyn Roush’s claim that an account of knowledge based on probabilistic tracking (...) faces a version of the problem of generality. I argue that the problems she raises are specific to her account, and do not affect the version of the view that I have advanced. I then consider Brandom’s argument that the cases that motivate reliabilist epistemologies are in principle exceptional. I argue that he has failed to make a cogent case for this claim. I close with the suggestion that the representationalist approach to knowledge that I endorse and Brandom rejects is in principle compatible with the kind of pragmatist approach to belief and truth that both Brandom and I endorse. (shrink)

To the sceptic's contention that I don't know that I have hands because I don't know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference—the principle that recognising the validity of an inference from known (...) premises generates knowledge of the conclusion. I argue that, in the presence of some plausible assumptions, blocking the Moorean move does not require limiting the applicability of the transmission principle. Then I argue against Jim Pryor's contention that the Moorean argument transmits evidential support from its premises to its conclusion. (shrink)

The analysis of so-called ?strategic intentional fouls? (SIF) as well as the discussion of their validity in the normative systems of sports have a long track record. These fouls can be characterised as rule violations committed in order to be detected and which accept the corresponding sanction. However, there is an additional goal of obtaining an advantage or subsequent benefit in the competition. In fact, this practice is not infrequent and it is even occasionally accepted by the players themselves, referees, (...) judges, sports authorities and spectators. In this work I have analysed the internal structure of SIFs (the features of an axiological gap and a ?special intention?) with a view to providing a deeper understanding and stressing the differences with closely related concepts: cheating, and especially fraus legis or what in Anglo-Saxon culture is called ?spoiling the game?. Finally, I try to show some difficulties in distinguishing SIF from gamesmanship. (shrink)

Una consecuencia de la revolución digital es la aparición del big data, que puede ser considerado como un elemento fundamental para la constitución de eso que autores como Byung-Chul Han denominan “psicopolítica”. Según Han, la sociedad en que vivimos tiene dos fundamentales características que se complementan entre sí: la nuestra es una “sociedad de la transparencia” y también una “sociedad digital”. Estas dos características tienen negativas consecuencias para los humanos. Siguiendo a Foucault y Deleuze, Han considera que el ser humano (...) será capaz de escapar de la esclavitud impuesta por él mismo si logra transformar el peso cualitativo de sus acciones. Es decir, si consigue que estas, en lugar de ser perfectamente predecibles y calculables, pasen a ser acontecimientos, en el pleno sentido de esta palabra: creaciones impredecibles que contribuyan, en términos nietzscheanos, a su autosuperación y, por ende, a hacer de su vida una obra de arte. (shrink)

The paper deals with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's views on the power of occurrent mental states to sort objects or states of affairs as in accord or in conflict with them, as presented in the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I shall argue first that the readings advanced by Saul Kripke and John McDowell fail to provide a satisfactory construal of Wittgenstein's treatment of a platonist account of this phenomenon, according to which the sorting power of occurrent mental states (...) is to be explained by reference to the mind's ability to grasp universals. I contend that the argument that Kripke extracts from Wittgenstein's discussion doesn't succeed in undermining the platonist position. Then I argue that McDowell's reading exhibits a more serious shortcoming: the position that he ascribes to Wittgenstein is indistinguishable from the platonist account. Then I put forward a proposal as to how to articulate the relationship between Wittgenstein's views and the platonist position. (shrink)

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a (...) version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put real pressure on (...) externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more briefly, I take issue with BonJour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were true it would not offer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem. I contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to abandon his construal of the problem. (shrink)

An introduction to the basic concepts and results of contemporary logic, including a discussion of the basic mathematical tools needed to master the technical aspects of the subject.

I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are (...) false in nearby worlds), satisfying the constraint requires bringing the risk under control. This is achieved either by sensitivity, i.e. you wouldn’t have the belief if it were false, or by identifying evidence for the proposition. However, when the risk of error is not substantial (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are not false in nearby worlds), the constraint is satisfied by default. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat is insensitive and I have no evidence for it, but since it is not false in nearby worlds, it satisfies the constraint by default. (shrink)

According to actualism, modal reality is constructed out of valuations (combinations of truth values for all propositions). According to possibilism, modal reality consists in a set of possible worlds, conceived as independent objects that assign truth values to propositions. According to possibilism, accounts of modal reality can intelligibly disagree with each other even if they agree on which valuations are contained in modal reality. According to actualism, these disagreements (possibilist disagreements) are completely unintelligible. An essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional (...) logic specifies which sets of valuations are compatible with the meanings of the truth-functional connectives and modal operators without drawing on formal resources that would enable us to represent possibilist disagreements. The paper discusses the availability of an essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. I argue that the standard Kripkean semantics is not essentially actualist and that other extant approaches also fail to provide a satisfactory essentially actualist semantics. I end by describing an essentialist actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. (shrink)